CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE

# Intelligence Information Cable

IN -15535

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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC DDI EXO OER NIC FBIS NSA DCS SDO IRS ONE XXX CRS USIA

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[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)

20 20 13Z

LOWDLE DIST 20 DECEMBER 196

BUDGET
DAVID
FRIED
GIBSON
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNS
KEEN
LEONHART
ROCHE
SAUNDERS
TAYLOR

COUNTRY CUBA/UNITED STATES

DOI [redacted]

SUBJECT VIEWS OF A CUBAN OFFICIAL ON THE FUTURE OF CUBAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

ACQ [redacted]

FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] CUBA'S FUTURE IS DEPENDENT ON EITHER OF TWO CONTINGENCIES

A. ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM WHICH WILL RESULT IN AN INTERNATIONAL SITUATION SO TENSE AS TO PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO INTERVENE IN CUBA WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE CONSEQUENCES;

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
12 FEB 1997

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

• S E C R E T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

B. A NEGOTIATED PEACE IN VIETNAM, ALONG WITH A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IN THE 1968 ELECTIONS AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH COULD RESULT, IN TIME, IN A SITUATION IN WHICH CUBA WOULD BE TOLERATED, AND LATER ACCEPTED, BY THE UNITED STATES, PROVIDED THERE WERE A CORRESPONDING CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

2. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)
[redacted]
SECOND SITUATION, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH MAKING THE FIRST SITUATION, INTERVENTION, MORE DIFFICULT BY CREATING A STATE OF MILITARY READINESS WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM SEIZING CUBA WITHIN 24 HOURS AND PRESENTING THE WORLD WITH A "FAIT ACCOMPLI."

3. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] IN 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)
SEPTEMBER 1967, THE CONSENSUS OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WAS THAT AS SOON AS THE WAR IN VIETNAM WAS TERMINATED, THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT A MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CUBA AND THAT THE CUBANS FELT CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD WITHSTAND AN ATTACK LONG ENOUGH TO INVOLVE THE SOVIET UNION. [redacted]
[redacted]

4. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCSO. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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• S E C R E T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)